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Abstract
This paper shows that cross-border mergers are more likely to occur in industries which serve
multiple segmented markets rather than a single integrated market, given that cost functions are
strictly convex. The product price rises in the market where an acquisition is made but falls in the
other, decreasing the acquisition price of other rms (in contrast to the results in the existing merger
literature on integrated markets). Although the sum of consumer surplus across the countries may
rise in response to a given acquisition, one of the countries gains at the expense of the other.
JEL classications: L12, L40, L41, F15, F23




Mergers and acquisitions have played an important role in the evolution of industry structure
worldwide. According to Gaughan (2002), the rst merger wave in the early 1900s transformed
the US economy from one with many small rms to one with larger dominant rms. In 1911, for
example, Standard Oil was found guilty of monopolizing the industry through acquisitions. More
recent evidence (1970 - 2000) is provided by Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001) who illustrate
that mergers occur in waves and that within a wave, mergers strongly cluster by industry.
Over the decades, due to globalization, merger1 waves have taken on an increasingly interna-
tional dimension. The volume of cross-border mergers has grown over time such that, in 2000, the
ratio of the value of global cross-border mergers to the value of global foreign direct investment
(FDI) was about 80% (UNCTAD (2000)).2 There is considerable evidence that cross-border merg-
ers tend to occur in waves (see, for example, Gaughan (2002), Gugler et al (2003) and UNCTADs
World Investment Report (2004)). This paper illuminates one channel through which these "waves"
are generated.
The key result of this paper is that the greater the degree of market segmentation across
the markets served by a given industry and the more convex the cost function faced by rms in
the industry, the more likely that multiple acquisitions across several countries are realized either
simultaneously or in close succession. Such a merger wave would be less likely to occur in an
integrated market where, after an acquisition in one country, the market price of the product would
rise in all countries, making it more expensive to acquire other rms (see, for example, Gaudet and
Salant (1992), Kamien and Zang (1990, 1991, 1993)3 and Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)).
This result gains further importance in light of the overwhelming empirical evidence in support
of the existence of market segmentation across countries (see, for example, Atkeson and Burstein
(2008) and Knetter (1989, 1993) for evidence of price discrimination by exporting rms across
1For the purposes of this paper, the terms "mergers" and "acquisitions" are used interchangeably.
2Gugler et al (2003) also nd an upward trend in the percentage of mergers that are cross-border, a trend that
was particularly pronounced for EU countries in the 1990s. The percentage of all mergers in Continental Europe that
were cross-border rose from 24.2% in 1991-92 to 39.8% in 1997-98.
3Kamien and Zang (1990) show that there are limitations to the possibility of the endogenous monopolization
of a homogenous good Cournot oligopoly through one rms acquisitions of the others. Whilst Kamien and Zang
(1990) assume identical constant marginal costs of production, Kamien and Zang (1991) extends the above result
to an industry with a strictly convex cost function. Kamien and Zang (1993) further extend this result to the case




Moreover, the main result of this paper is supported by the following empirical observation. Ac-
cording to UNCTADs World Investment Reports (WIR) (2006-2010), during the last two decades,
each year about 60% of all cross-border mergers worldwide have been realized within service indus-
tries such as nancial services. This is in line with Norbäck and Persson (2008b) which provides
further details regarding cross-border mergers in service industries. The standard example in most
IO texts of an industry where market segmentation and price discrimination prevail is service in-
dustries since the nature of these industries does not allow consumers to resell the service in order
to gain from arbitrage. Furthermore, these industries typically have lower xed costs than manu-
facturing industries, which is another condition under which the result of this paper is more likely
to be realized.5 Thus, this paper provides a possible explanation for the dominance of the service
sector in the total value/volume of cross-border mergers worldwide.
The set of conditions identied in this paper that induce cross-border merger waves includes
not only market segmentation but also convexity of cost functions, which is a standard assumption
in many IO models. If costs were linear and markets segmented, an acquisition in one market
would have no impact on the other market.6 It is established in the seminal work of Perry and
Porter (1985) that a given merger is more protable in industries facing convex costs. However,
Perry and Porter (1985) does not investigate the impact of one merger on the protability of
subsequent mergers in the industry. Kamien and Zang (1991) show that despite the existence of
4Atkeson and Burstein (2008) use aggregate price data from exporting manufacturing rms in the US, the UK,
Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada for the period 1985-2006. Knetter (1989, 1993) uses the annual value and
quantity of exports to selected destination countries for a number of seven-digit industries in four source countries:
the US, the UK, Japan, and Germany, for the period 1975-1987. The industries in his data set include durables,
nondurables and intermediate goods.
5The WIR 2010 summarizes the sectoral distribution of cross-border mergers, by industry of seller, for the period
19902009, where the sectors are categorized as primary, manufacturing and services. They note that during the
period 1990-1995, the share of service sector in the total value of cross-border merger worldwide was about 50%.
This percentage rose to more than 60% during 1995-2000 and remained so during 2000-2005. Annual data thereafter
(inclusive of 2009) shows that this gure has remained consistently close to 60% except in 2008 (during the nancial
crisis) when it fell to 40%. Moreover, during all these periods, these gures have been higher by about 10 percentage
points in developing countries as compared to developed countries. For further details please refer to Figure I.9
in UNCTADs World Investment Report 2010. Similar shares apply when we focus on the number of cross-border
mergers rather than value. For example, according to WIR 2010, in 2007 the service sector share of the total number
of cross-border mergers worldwide was 65%, in 2008 it was 62%, and in 2009 it was 63%.
According to WIR 2010, during the nancial crisis in 2008 when the value of cross-border merger transactions fell
in most sectors, the fall in the manufacturing sector (77%) was greater than the services sector (57%) overall. An
exception was the nancial services sector (87%).
6See Nguyen and Schaur (2010) for empirical evidence supporting the theory that markets are linked through
convex costs.
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convex cost functions, within a context of Cournot oligopolists serving a single integrated market,
an acquisition raises the market price of the product, making it more expensive to acquire other
rms in the industry. This paper provides an instance where Kamien and Zangs result is reversed,
that is, one set of acquisitions actually lowers the market price in one of the markets, making it
cheaper to acquire local rms. In this paper, this reversal is only possible when, along with convex
costs, the oligopolists operate across segmented markets allowing them to engage in third degree
price discrimination.
Given the empirical relevance of cross-border mergers, the theoretical literature on cross-border
mergers remains small relative to that on greeneld FDI (Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004),
Caves (1996), Helpman (1984), Klimenko and Saggi (2007), Markusen (2002), Mattoo, Olarreaga
and Saggi (2004), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008)).7
Existing papers that model cross-border mergers are mostly built around some exogenously
given asymmetry between domestic and foreign rms such as di¤erences in production costs (e.g.
Bertrand and Zitouna (2006), Long and Vousden (1995), Neary (2007)) and access to information
(e.g. Das and Sengupta (2001), Qiu and Zhou (2006)).8 In contrast, this paper shows that even
when countries are identical and all rms have access to the same technology and information, a
wave of cross-border mergers may be triggered by trade liberalization and sustained purely by the
strategic interaction of rms. This paper abstracts away from the possibility of greeneld FDI in
order to focus on the process by which multinational rms acquire local rms and to isolate a set
of conditions that facilitate the realization of cross-border mergers.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on the determinants and welfare e¤ects of
endogenous cross-border mergers. In this literature, most papers use a combination of market power
and synergies or trade cost savings to explain equilibrium cross-border mergers (Bjorvatn (2004),
Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2006), Horn and Persson (2001), Norbäck and Persson (2008a)). Some
7Some of these papers do include the possibility of cross-border mergers. The focus, however, is on determining
the conditions under which cross-border mergers are the prefered mode of entry to greeneld FDI. For example,
Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004) show how rms in monopolistic competition have an incentive to merge, but
do not explore the implications of a rst merger for subsequent ones. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) show how interrm
di¤erences in country-specic rm capabilities a¤ect the choice between greeneld and acquisition FDI. However,
they assume that the market for capabilities is perfectly competitive. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) use a more general
setting and show that rms engaging in greeneld entry are systematically more e¢cient than those engaging in
cross-border mergers.
8An alternative approach taken by Horn and Persson (2001) and Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2006) is to explore
international mergers as the outcome of a cooperative game.
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other papers use labour market e¤ects (Lommerud, Straume, Sorgard (2006) and Straume (2003)),
and tax advantages arising from cross-border mergers (Norbäck and Persson (2009)) to explain
equilibrium cross-border mergers. This paper adds to this literature by showing that a combination
of access to multi-plant activities and cost reallocation for multinational enterprise (MNEs) could
explain equilibrium cross-border mergers when the industry is spread across multiple segmented
markets.
More specically, this paper considers a two-country model with a MNE that sells its product in
both markets. The markets are segmented. Each country is also served by local rms. According to
Bernard et al (2007), of the 5.5 million rms operating in the United States in 2000, just 4 percent
were exporters.9 The rms compete in quantities in the product market and sell a homogeneous
good. Within this context, I study the incentives of the MNE to acquire the local rms. Empirical
evidence shows that a large proportion of cross-border acquisitions are indeed undertaken by MNEs
as a means of entering a new market (Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008)).
The acquisition game presented here consists of the MNE announcing bids for each of the local
rms, which the local rms may accept or reject. It is assumed, as is common to much of the
merger literature, that due to barriers to entry, rms cannot enter this industry.
Given the convex cost structure faced by rms, after an acquisition, the owner of the merged
entity minimizes cost by equating marginal cost across all rms he owns. This leads to price
discrimination, as shown in the paper.10 If a multinational rm acquires a local rm in one of
the markets, the price of the product in that market is shown to rise and the price in the other
market is shown to fall. This decreases the prot that each local rm would obtain if it unilaterally
remained outside a merger to monopoly. Consequently, local rms become cheaper to acquire.
This paper also distinguishes between "closer economic integration" and "trade liberalization"
in the form of tari¤ cuts in the following sense. Henceforth, the rst term refers to the reduction of
frictions across markets, at any given tari¤ level, which allows consumers to prot from arbitrage
opportunities across markets, such that price discrimination becomes ine¤ective. Also, the term
9 In order to explain why, in reality, some rms do not export whilst others do, a number of studies have shown
that setting up export activities is costly and requires an initial investment (e.g. Melitz (2003), Roberts and Tybout
(1997)). This is because, as the management strategy literature posits, some capabilities, such as marketing, dis-
tribution, and country-specic institutional competency are imperfectly mobile across countries (Anand and Delios
(2002)). This paper abstracts away from these features for ease of exposition.
10This nding is in line with Bulow et al (1985) who show that a rms actions in one market can change competitors
strategies in another market by a¤ecting its own marginal cost in the second market.
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"trade liberalization" refers to the reduction of tari¤s, given that the markets continue to be
segmented, due to some source of friction other than tari¤s, such that it is costly for consumers to
engage in arbitrage across markets. The paper shows that the impact of these two phenomena on
merger waves may be very di¤erent.
This has an important implication for empirical work. The general conclusion in existing em-
pirical studies that "trade liberalization" and "economic integration" play a similar role in driving
cross-border merger waves11 needs to be re-examined in light of this papers ndings. This paper
shows that "trade liberalization" may trigger the mechanism by which cross-border mergers occur,
as outlined in this paper. On the other hand, this mechanism is unambiguously thwarted by "eco-
nomic integration". Thus, this paper illustrates the need to include a measure of the degree to
which markets are segmented, at any given tari¤ level, across di¤erent industries and countries in
future empirical analyses to identify the di¤erent roles of "trade liberalization" and "economic inte-
gration". This can be expected to generate new policy implications. For example, in the case of the
EU, the cross-border merger wave of the 1990s is often attributed to closer "economic integration"
in the form of the EU Single Market Treaty. However, despite the announcement of the extension of
the EU Single Market Treaty, there prevailed market segmentation and price discrimination across
the EU Member States in the 1990s (see Crucini et al (2005), Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and
Fabiani et al (2005)). As per the insight provided by this paper, it may indeed be the persistence
of market segmentation together with "trade liberalization", rather than "closer economic integra-
tion", that was responsible for the EU merger wave. This provides a new rationale in favour of the
European Commissions policy to actively achieve integration of national markets.12
This paper also contributes to the literature on the welfare e¤ects of mergers.13 The paper shows
that the same merger can decrease consumer surplus in one market and simultaneously increase
11See Brakman et al (2006), Chudnovsky (2000) and European Commission (1996). An exception is Breinlich
(2008) which is not able to establish a robust link between tari¤ reductions and cross-border mergers between US
and Canada.
12 In order to facilitate integration of the national markets within the EU, the European Commission has actively
encouraged (within limits) arbitrage, harmonized taxes and other national regulations, increased transparency, mon-
itored cross-country price di¤erences and created the European Monetary Union to reduce exchange rate volatility
(Goldberg and Verboven (2005)).
13A related topic that has been addressed in the literature is the determination of conditions under which it is
benecial to set up a supra-national antitrust authority (e.g. Falvey (1998), Head and Ries (1997)). Another set
of papers study the interaction between trade and competition policies (e.g. Francois and Horn (1998), Horn and
Levinsohn (2001), Saggi and Yildiz (2006)). Norbäck and Persson (2007) compares liberalization programs which
allow greeneld investments but not cross-border mergers and those that allow both.
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consumer surplus in another. This has policy implications for international antitrust authorities
such as the European Commision (EC).14 If an international antitrust authority disallows all merg-
ers that are not Pareto improving across countries (using the consumer surplus standard), then
it may not maximize aggregate consumer surplus of all countries under its jurisdiction.15 These
policy implications also hold for national antitrust authorities of large countries such as the US
where the domestic market for a good may consist of several segmented markets.
On the one hand, the above result suggests that the antitrust authority can be more relaxed
when reviewing a given merger in isolation. On the other hand, this paper also shows that, if the
rms serve multiple segmented markets, allowing one merger may lead to a spate of cross-border
mergers, which might ultimately lower consumer surplus in all countries involved. This warrants
greater caution on the part of antitrust authorities in an increasingly globalized world. This result
is of particular concern because it has been observed that MNEs are increasingly acquiring rms in
emerging and developing economies16 which may be unable to prevent the acquisitions undertaken
by MNEs due to non-existent, weak or corrupt institutions including antitrust authorities.17 Indeed,
the interaction of MNEs and local rms that this paper models, is particularly relevant to many
developing countries and emerging markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 compares the likelihood
of the monopolization of the industry under segmented markets and integrated markets. Section
4 discusses the policy implications within this setting. Section 5 discusses the e¤ect of trade
liberalization on the process of monopolization and on welfare. Section 6 concludes.
14 In Europe, the EC Merger Regulation distinguishes between mergers that have and mergers that do not have a
"Community dimension". The latter involve large rms that operate in several Member states and must be notied
to the EC in advance. Mergers that do not have a Community dimension are examined by the relevant Member
States antitrust authority.
15 Indeed, the current policy of the EC is to reject mergers that harm any of its Member States, for example, in the
Scania-Volvo merger case, more details of which are provided in footnote 21.
16Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in emerging markets have been rising since the 1990s. During 1991-2000
cross-border M&As accounted for 61% of foreign direct investment in Latin America and 48% in East Asia, as
compared to 10% and 4% in the 1980s (see Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2004) for further details).
According to WIR 2010, over two thirds of cross-border M&A transactions still involve developed countries, but
the share of developing and transition economies as hosts to those transactions has risen from 26 per cent in 2007 to
31 per cent in 2009.
17For example, in India, trade liberalization and liberalization of restrictions on foreign ownership of assets were
implemented widely starting in 1991. However, the Indian Competition Act only came into force in 2002, the




Consider an industry consisting of n rms and m  n owners of rms. Each rm is owned in its
entirety by a single owner. Please note that the terms "rm" and "plant" are equivalent within the
context of this paper. Each rm produces a homogenous product and has a cost function, given by
C (q).
Assumption 1: The cost function, C (q) ; is increasing, C 0 (q) > 0; and twice continuously di¤er-
entiable, has no xed cost, C (0) = 0; and is strictly convex, implying that C 00 (q) > 0 for all q > 0;
where q denotes the total output of each rm: 18
The model consists of two periods. In the rst period, owner 1 acquires rms owned by other
owners. The acquisition process is detailed below. In the second period, all the remaining owners
act as Cournot oligopolists. At the beginning of the rst period, owner 1 owns n1 rms. The rest
of the (m  1) owners own nj rms each, for j 2 [2; :::;m]. Although not necessary for deriving the
results in this paper, it is useful to think of nj as being strictly less than n1 for j 2 [2; :::;m]. That
is, owner 1 initially owns more rms than any of the others. Given strictly convex costs, the greater
the number of rms owned by an owner, the lower his cost of production of a given amount of the
output, as formally stated in Lemma 1 below. Although not modeled explicitly, the lower cost of
owner 1 provides a justication for the assumption in this paper that owner 1 is able to serve both
markets and to acquire rms as opposed to the other owners. This also reects the reality that
multinational rms often own more rms and have lower costs than do local rms and is in line
with the emprical evidence provided by Breinlich (2008) which concludes that "acquirers tend to
be bigger, more protable and more productive". In Section 3 we discuss how the main results of
this paper may also carry over to the case where there exist multiple acquirers.
Consider two countries denoted by A and B. Within this context, we consider the following
two scenarios.
1. Segmented markets
The two markets, A and B; are segmented. Owner 1 sells the joint output of its n1 rms in both
countries. Owner j for j 2 [2; :::;m] ; where mA < m   1; sells the joint output of its nj rms
18This is identical to the cost specication used in Kamien and Zang (1991).
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in country A only. That is, mA number of owners own "local" rms that sell their output in A
only. Owner j for j 2 [mA + 1; :::;m] ; sells the joint output of its nj rms in country B only. Let
mB  m   1  mA: That is, mB number of owners own "local" rms that sell their output in B
only. In Section 3, we discuss how the main result may carry over to the situation where all rms
sell their output in both markets. The inverse demand in country i is given by Pi (Qi) where Qi
denotes the total volume sold in country i. It is assumed that the following properties hold for
i = A;B:
Assumption 2:
1. Pi (Qi) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, Pi (0) and P
0
i (0) are nite, P
0
i (Qi) < 0 for all
Qi  0 and Pi (0) > C
0 (0) :
2. The second derivative of the industry total revenue function in each country, QiPi (Qi) ; is
negative, i.e. (QiPi (Qi))
00 < 0 for all Qi  0: Note that this assumption implies strict
concavity of the industry total revenue function in each country.
2. Integrated markets
In this scenario, the markets of A and B; are integrated. Let Q represent the total volume sold
in the single market. The inverse demand is given by P (Q). It is assumed that the following
conditions, as per Assumption 2, are satised.
Assumption 2:
1. P (Q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, P (0) and P 0 (0) are nite, P 0 (Q) < 0 for all Q  0
and P (0) > C 0 (0) :
2. The industry total revenue function QP (Q) possesses a negative second derivative, i.e. (QP (Q))00 <
0 for all Q  0:
The focus of this paper is on the scenario with segmented markets. The scenario with integrated
markets is introduced as a benchmark against which to compare the e¤ects of market segmentation.
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2.1 The Acquisition Game
The acquisition process consists of two stages.
Stage 1:
Each rm is initially owned and operated by one of the m owners. If a rm is sold during Stage
1, it becomes operated by its buyer. For clarity, it is assumed that only owner 1 is allowed to buy
other rms.
Owner 1 makes o¤ers to each of the other owners. An o¤er to owner i, for i 2 [2; :::;m] ; consists
of the number of rms that owner 1 wishes to buy from owner i and a bid for the entirety of each
of these rms. Owner i, for i 2 [2; :::;m] ; decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er made by
owner 1. At the end of Stage 1, owner 1 buys all the rms whose owners accept the o¤ers they
received and does not buy the other rms in the industry. Let L represent the set of rms owned
by owner 1 at the end of Stage 1. Let K represent the set of owners that remain active at the end
of period 1, that is, those owners who have not sold all their rms to owner 1 during period 1.
In addition to paying the bids that are accepted; owner 1 pays a negotiation fee of   0 in
Stage 1.
Stage 2:
Given the pattern of acquisitions that is realized in Stage 1, each owner independently and simul-
taneously chooses the production levels at each of his rms in order to maximize the joint prot of
all rms he owns. The analysis in Stage 2 depends on whether markets are segmented or integrated
and on whether any acquisitions were realized in Stage 1. The following is a description of Stage 2
under both scenarios.
Stage 2 under segmented markets:
Owner 1 chooses (q1Aj ; q1Bj) for each rm j that he owns; where q1Aj (q1Bj) represents the output
produced in rm j and sold in country A (B) by owner 1: Let q1i 
P
j2L q1ij ; i = A;B denote the
total sales of owner 1 in market i: Similarly, each of the other owners chooses the output level at
each rm that he owns. Let qiA denote the total sales of owner i in market A for i 2 K\f2; :::;mAg
and qiB denote the total sales of owner i in market B for i 2 K \ fmA + 1; :::;mg. Note that while
the number of owners may decline after Stage 1, the number of rms does not.
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Owner 1s Stage 2 prot is given by:
1 = PA (QA) q1A + PB (QB) q1B  
X
j2L
Cj (q1Aj + q1Bj) (1)
The Stage 2 prot of each of the owners of the local rms in A who remains active is given by:
k = PA (QA) qkA  
X
j2nk
Cj (qkAj) ; if k 2 K \ f2; :::;mAg (2)
The Stage 2 prot of each of the owners of the local rms in B who remains active is given by:
k = PB (QB) qkB  
X
j2nk
Cj (qkBj) ; if k 2 K \ fmA + 1; :::;mg
Assumption 3: Each active owners reaction curve slopes downward in each market. Equivalently,
an increase in rivals output in each market lowers owner ks marginal revenue, for i = A;B. That
is,
P 0i (Qi) + P
00
i (Qi) qki < 0; for i = A;B; k 2 K (3)
Stage 2 under integrated markets:19
Each active owner chooses qk; and his Stage 2 prots are given by:
k = P (Q) qk  
X
j2nk
nkCj (qkj) ; k 2 K
Assumption 3: The following holds:
P 0 (Q) + P 00 (Q) qk < 0; for k 2 K
Under both scenarios (segmented and integrated markets), each players payo¤ is the sum of
the Stage 2 operating prots of all the rms he owns plus the net trade cash ow from Stage 1.
Lemma 1: Under both segmented and integrated markets, for every possible ownership conguration,
a pure strategy Stage 2 Cournot equilibrium of the acquisition game exists. In this equilibrium, all
19Stage 2 under integrated markets is identical to Kamien and Zang (1991).
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rms are operated, and every owner possessing at least one rm produces the same quantity in each.
Proof: For integrated markets, see Proposition 1 in Kamien and Zang (1991). The proof for
segmented markets is a straightforward extension of Proposition 1 in Kamien and Zang (1991) and
is available upon request.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. An owner of multiple rms minimizes total
cost of production by equating the marginal cost across all his rms. Given identical and strictly
convex cost functions at each rm, this is achieved by equally splitting production across all the
rms that the owner owns.
Before proceeding to analyze the equilibria of this game, let us rst consider the e¤ect of an
exogenously given acquisition by owner 1 on prices and quantities in Stage 2 for both scenarios.
The following lemma facilitates our analysis of a merged equilibrium, analyzed in the next section.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the case where owner 1 acquires M of the local rms in
country A:
Henceforth, all variables corresponding to outcomes subsequent to the acquisition of the M
local rms in A by owner 1, are denoted by the subscript "M": Also, all variables corresponding to
outcomes subsequent to the acquisition of all rms in both countries by owner 1, are denoted by
the subscript "mon":
Lemma 2: Subsequent to the acquisition of M rms in A by owner 1, it follows that
(i) under segmented markets, a rise in price in A (that is, PA (QA) < PA (QMA)) and a fall in price
in B (that is, PB (QB) > PB (QMB)):
(ii) under integrated markets, a rise in price (that is, P (Q) < P (QM )):
Proof: See appendix.
The result for the single integrated market, Lemma 2(ii), follows directly from Proposition 3
in Kamien and Zang (1991). Interestingly, this result does not carry over to Scenario 1, where
the markets are segmented, as shown by Lemma 2(i). The acquisition causes the price level to
simultaneously rise in one country and fall in the other, that is, price discrimination across the two
countries is intensied.
The key intuition driving the results in this paper, as embodied by Lemma 2, is as follows.
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Subsequent to the acquisition of the M rms in A, owner 1 faces the following tradeo¤ in market
A. The rst e¤ect is that, due to increased market power, owner 1 has an incentive to decrease
the quantity sold in A. The second e¤ect is that the acquisition allows owner 1 to split his total
output equally across all rms (by Lemma 1), thereby reducing his marginal cost at the pre-merger
output level. Thus, by the second e¤ect, owner 1 has an incentive to increase his total output.
Lemma 2 shows that the former e¤ect dominates in market A, thereby raising the price level in A.
In contrast to A, owner 1 faces no tradeo¤ in B, since his market power remains unchanged. The
only e¤ect faced by owner 1 in B of the acquisition in A is the second e¤ect, which explains the
decrease in the price level in B.
This generates new insights regarding the incentives of multinational rms to monopolize an
industry and the welfare e¤ects of such acquisitions.
3 E¤ect of market segmentation on cross-border merger waves
This section focuses on the rms incentives to merge in the absence of an antitrust authority. The
role of the antitrust authority will be examined in the following section.
For ease of exposition, I begin by presenting the main result using the case where m = 3: I then
show that the main result may be generalized to cases with m > 3: Let nA (nB) be the number of
local rms in A (B) :
Scenario 1: Consider three owners where owner 1 owns n1 rms, owner 2 owns local rms in A
only and owner 3 owns local rms in B only : A and B are identical countries such that nA = nB
and PA (:) = PB (:) :
Given Scenario 1, consider the possibility of a merged equilibrium to the game in which owner
1 possesses all rms. Let mon denote owner 1s Stage 2 monopoly prots and let ̂1 be his
Stage 2 prots if he does not acquire any rms. Certainly, owner 1 is unwilling to pay more than
mon   ̂1 > 0 for the other rms altogether, as ̂1 is his opportunity cost. Now consider each of
the sellers, owners 2 and 3. Let ̂ be the Stage 2 prots of owner i for i = 2; 3 if he unilaterally
rejects owner 1s bid whilst the other owner does not. It follows that owner 1 has to pay at least 2̂
in order to induce owners 2 and 3 to accept the o¤er: Thus, a merger wave that results in complete
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monopolization is an equilibrium as long as the following holds:
mon   ̂1  2̂ +  (4)
Given that (4) holds, owner 1 will pay the least possible amount to owners 2 and 3 which still
induces them to sell. That is, owner 1 will pay 2̂ +  at the equilibrium: Let owner 1s gain from
the merger wave, as compared to not acquiring any rms, be denoted by:
G  mon   (2̂ + )  ̂1
It follows that G  0 if and only if
  ̂  mon   2̂   ̂1 (5)
Whilst comparing the scenarios, we say that the merger wave is more likely to occur if G is non-
negative for a greater range of negotiation costs, : In other words, the merger wave is more likely
to occur the greater is ̂:
Proposition 1: Given Scenario 1, a merger wave is more likely to occur under segmented markets
than under integrated markets.
Proof: For notational convenience, let subscripts S and I denote segmented markets and inte-
grated markets respectively. It follows that
monjS = monjI (6)
̂1jS = ̂1jI (7)
and
̂jS < ̂jI (8)
In (6) and (7) ; the equality holds because, for identical countries, the monopoly and Cournot
oligopoly equilibrium outcomes with segmented markets are identical to those with integrated
markets, that is, with and without price discrimination across the countries.
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The inequality in (8) follows from Lemma 2 and Assumptions 3 and 3. Lemma 2 shows that by
unilaterally refusing to sell his rm, an owner faces a lower market price under segmented markets
than under integrated markets. This is because owner 1, under segmented markets, subsequent to
the acquisition in market i increases the quantity sold in market j; as shown in the proof of Lemma
2 (see appendix), whereas under integrated markets, he lowers quantity sold in both countries.
This, together with Assumptions 3 and 3, imply that the output of the outsider to the merger falls
(rises) under segmented (integrated) markets due to the merger of the other two rms. Therefore,
an owner, by unilaterally refusing to sell his rm, earns less under segmented markets than under
integrated markets.
From (6) ; (7) and (8) ; it follows that
̂jS > ̂jI (9)
Proposition 1 follows directly from (9) : 
Proposition 1 states that a merger wave will occur for a larger range of negotiation costs, ;
under segmented markets than under integrated markets. That is, when markets are segmented,
acquisitions by the MNE are more likely to occur than when the markets are integrated. This is
because the cost of acquiring each rm is lower due to Lemma 2 under segmented markets than
under integrated markets.
In Proposition 1, I have assumed that owner 1 simultaneously bids for all local rms. Would ̂
be any di¤erent if owner 1 moved sequentially, that is, acquiring owner is rms only after owner
js rms had been acquired and Stage 2 prots realized? Let 2 be the duopoly prots from market
A that owner 2 would obtain by refusing to sell when owner 1 bids for owner 2s rms only. That
is, 2 is owner 2s opportunity cost of selling out. Owner 3s opportunity cost, once owner 2s rms
have been acquired is given by ̂; as in the simultaneous move game. That 2 > ̂ follows directly
from Lemma 2. In this case, both owners 2 and 3 compete to be the rst to sell out. This process
reduces each of their reservation prices to ̂: Thus, the sequential move acquisition game has the
same outcome as the simultaneous move game described in this paper.
Proposition 1 focuses on the case with three owners in order to present the main message of
the paper as clearly as possible. Next, I turn to the more general case where there exist multiple
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owners of local rms in each country. Proposition 2 extends the main result stated by Proposition 1
to the case where owner 1 wishes to acquire rms from a single owner in each country, even though
there may exist more owners of local rms in each country.
Proposition 2: For nA = nB and PA (:) = PB (:) ; simultaneous acquisitions by owner 1 from a
single owner in each market ; are more likely to occur under segmented markets than under integrated
markets.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is a straightforward extension of that of Proposition 1 and is
available in the appendix.
Proposition 2 focuses on the case where owner 1 wishes to acquire rms owned by a single owner
in A and by a single owner in B; even though there may exist other owners in these countries: The
following proposition allows for the possibility that owner 1 acquires rms from multiple owners in
either one or both countries and that the countries are non-identical. Consider two cost functions,
C1 (:) and C2 (:) with C
00
1 (:) < C
00
2 (:) : The cost function C2 (:) is said to be "more convex" than
C1 (:) :
Proposition 3: The more convex the cost function, the more likely that simultaneous acquisitions
across both markets of a given number of rms occur under segmented markets relative to integrated
markets.
Under segmented markets, there are two counteractive e¤ects of simultaneous acquisitions of
rms in both countries on the equilibrium price in each country. E¤ect 1: The acquisition of the
rms in j decreases the price level in i; as per Lemma 2. E¤ect 2: The acquisition of rms in
i increases the price level in i; also as per Lemma 2. The magnitude of E¤ect 1 (E¤ect 2) is
increasing (decreasing) in the degree of convexity of the cost function. This is because, the greater
the convexity of the cost function, the lower the post-acquisition marginal cost of owner 1 and
therefore, the greater the post-acquisition output of owner 1. By a similar argument as in the
proofs of Propositions 1-2, it follows that E¤ect 1 (2) reduces (increases) the price that owner 1
needs to pay to acquire each rm. Ceteris paribus, the more convex the cost function, the greater
is E¤ect 1 relative to E¤ect 2. If the cost function is su¢ciently convex, E¤ect 1 dominates E¤ect
2. That is, each owner, if he unilaterally refuses to sell out, faces a negative externality from the
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acquisition of the other rms. On the other hand, under integrated markets, from Lemma 2 (ii),
only E¤ect 2 exists, although the magnitude of E¤ect 2 is smaller the more convex the cost function.
That is, each owner, if he unilaterally refuses to sell out, always faces a positive externality from
the acquisition of the other rms under integrated markets.
Therefore, if the degree of convexity of the cost function is beyond a given threshold, owner 1
needs to pay a lower price to acquire each rm under segmented markets than under integrated
markets. Proposition 3 follows.
Although for ease of exposition, Propositions 1-2 have been derived under the assumption of
identical countries, the main intuition carries through to cases where the two countries have di¤erent
demand functions, as illustrated in the following section. This is because Lemma 2, which drives
the result, holds for countries with asymmetric demand functions. Proposition 3 states that the
main result (that cross-border merger waves are more likely to occur when markets are segmented
rather than integrated) is more likely to hold the more convex the cost function faced by the rms in
the industry, regardless of asymmetries across countries in terms of demand conditions and number
of rms.
It is also straightforward to extend Lemma 2 to the case where more than two countries are
being served by owner 1, where an acquisition in one of the countries would increase the quantity
sold by owner 1 in all other markets.
Although for ease of exposition, all owners apart from 1 are assumed to possess purely local
rms before they are acquired, it is straightforward to show that Lemma 2 extends to cases where
these rms do export but each of their export volumes before they are acquired is su¢ciently lower
than that of the n1 rms originally owned by owner 1 due to factors exogenous to the model. Thus,
Propositions 1-3 may hold in these alternative settings.
In the presence of multiple acquirers, the acquirers may compete with each other to acquire
the local rms, bidding up their price and countering the e¤ect of Lemma 2 on the price that
local owners are willing to accept to sell out (see, for example, Toxvaerd (2008) for a model of
endogenous acquisitions with multiple acquirers). However, such competition amongst acquirers
would occur under both segmented as well as integrated markets, such that when the two scenarios
are compared, similar results hold as per Propositions 1-3.
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4 Implications for merger policy
This section discusses the policy implications and the role of antitrust authorities within the context
of this model . First, let us consider the e¤ects of a given acquisition of M rms in A by owner 1.
Corollary 1: Following the acquisition of M rms in A by owner 1,
(i) under segmented markets, consumer surplus in country A (B) falls (rises).
(ii) under integrated markets, consumer surplus in both countries fall.
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 2. 
Let us suppose that, in line with the recent trend both in the US and in the EU, the antitrust
authorities use the consumer surplus standard (Whinston (2006)). If the acquisition of M rms
by owner 1 is being reviewed by a national antitrust authority (that of country A), then, as per
Corollary 1, it will be rejected. An interesting case arises if the merger is being reviewed by an
international antitrust authority such as the European Commission (EC). Suppose that both A and
B are EU Member States. If the ECs policy is to only approve mergers that are Pareto improving,
then again, this merger will be rejected.
However, if the EC aims to maximize aggregate consumer surplus across all member states,
then this merger might be approved. Next, I provide an example that illustrates this result.
Example 1 Consider three owners. Owner 1 owns rm 1 that sells its product in both A and B.








a Qi for i = A
b Qi for i = B





2 for i = 1; 2; 3










Owner 2s prot maximization problem is given by:
max
q2A





Owner 3s prot maximization problem is given by:
max
q3B















Owner 3s prot maximization problem is given by:
max
q3MB





It can be shown that all pre- and post-acquisition equilibrium quantities are strictly positive if and
only if a 2 (a
¯
; a) with a
¯
 0:375b and a  2: 666 7b: Moreover, the change in the quantity sold
in A due the acquisition of rm 2 by owner 1, QA   QMA; is strictly positive for all a such that
a 2 (a
¯
; a) : That is, the quantity in A falls due to the merger for all a 2 (a
¯
; a) ; implying that the
price in A rises due to the merger. The change in the quantity sold in B due to the acquisition of
rm 2 by owner 1, QB   QMB < 0 for all a; b > 0; implying that the price in B falls due to the
merger. Thus, this example is in line with Lemma 2. Moreover, it can be shown that the sum of
the changes in consumer surplus across both countries due to the acquisition of rm 2 by owner 1,
P
i=A;B (CSi   CSMi) ; is strictly negative for all a; b such that a 2 (a¯
, â) where â  0:62b: 
Example 1 illustrates the following.
Result 1: If the country where the acquisition is realized is su¢ciently small relative to the other,
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under segmented markets, the aggregate consumer surplus across both countries increases due to a
single acquisition.
One of the main justications behind establishing an international antitrust authority, such
as the EC, is that it has the ability to maximize joint welfare across all countries under its ju-
risdiction, an objective that cannot be reached with national antitrust authorities which behave
non-cooperatively. However, it has been observed that the EC uses a Pareto improving standard
when taking its decisions.20 The policy implication of Result 1 is that if an international antitrust
authority disallows all mergers that are not Pareto improving across countries (using the consumer
surplus standard), then it will not maximize aggregate consumer surplus of all countries under
its jurisdiction, given that some countries have considerably larger markets than others. This is
because the magnitude of the unrealized gain in consumer surplus in countries other than the one
where the acquisition occurs may outweigh any losses of consumer surplus within that country.
Moreover, within the context of this model, the antitrust authority would choose to approve
the merger in the smaller of the two countries only. Such a policy may not be politically feasible
to implement since smaller countries systematically lose at the expense of larger ones, unless some
mechanism for redistributing the gains of the larger county is designed to work alongside the merger
policy.
Now, let us consider the welfare implication of complete monopolization. It is straightforward
to show the following in Example 1.
Result 2: Regardless of segmented or integrated markets, complete monopolization results in lower
consumer surplus for each country compared to the equilibrium with no acquisitions.
Results 1 and 2, together, imply that the antitrust authority may be faced with an interesting
dilemma when the cost function of the merger participants is convex. In isolation, one or both of the
acquisitions (owner 1 buying rms 2 and 3) increase aggregate consumer surplus. However, taken
20For example, in 2000, the EC blocked Volvos proposal to acquire Scania AB (Volvos largest Swedish competitor
in the market for trucks and buses) on the basis that Volvo/Scania would obtain too large a market share in its home
market (EC decision 15/03/2000: Case No/ COMP/M.1672 Volvo/Scania). More specically the investigation was
limited to the ve countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Ireland) where the creation of a dominant
position was found (see Ivaldi and Verboven (2005)). This decision faced criticism from multiple sources. E.g. Volvo
claimed that Sweden only takes up about 5% of its business and that the merger might have led to lower prices for
consumers in other Member States with larger markets (Hemmingsson (2002)).
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together, the two acquisitions result in complete monopolization of the industry, reducing consumer
surplus to a level below that attained if none of the acquisitions are allowed. Provided that the
antitrust authority wishes to maximize aggregate consumer surplus, it would like to approve one
of the mergers but not both. This may be particularly di¢cult for developing countries to achieve
since they may lack strong institutions such as antitrust authorities.
5 Trade liberalization
Thus far, the paper has focused on the free trade equilibria under two di¤erent scenarios, segmented
and integrated markets. Now consider the case under segmented markets where there exists a per
unit tari¤, t; to be paid by the exporter to either country A or B. The e¤ect of trade liberalization21,
that is, reducing t; depends on the location of rm 1 (whether in A; B or in a third country), due
to the tari¤ jumping e¤ect. Depending on rm 1s location, it may not be prot maximizing for
owner 1, in Stage 2, to equally split output across all the rms that belong to him for any t > 0.
Moreover, the e¤ect of trade liberalization depends on the functional forms of demand and cost.
Next, I provide an example where trade liberalization triggers a cross-border merger wave.
Example 2 Let there be three owners. Owner 1 owns a single rm located in A and serving both
markets. Owner 2 owns a single local rm in A: Owner 3 owns two local rms in B: Let inverse
demand in each country be given by:
Pi (Qi) = d Qi for i = A;B





2 for i = 1; :::; 4
where qi is the total output of rm i: Additionally, owner 1 pays a tari¤, t; per unit exported from
one country to another. Let owner 1 move sequentially. First rm 2 in A is acquired, then Stage 2
prots are realized, and nally rms 3 and 4 in B are simultaneously acquired by owner 1. In this
21Note that "trade liberalization" in this context refers to a reduction in t and is not equivalent to closer "economic
integration". That is, this section focuses on the case where, even as t is reduced, the markets remain segmented
such that price discrimination across A and B continues to be possible.
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case, since rm 1 is located in A, in line with our previous analysis, it is indeed prot maximizing
for owner 1, in Stage 2, to equally split output across the two rms that belong to him subsequent
to the acquisition of rm 2, despite the presence of the tari¤. Also, once complete monopolization
occurs, the two countries are identical such that owner 1 does not have any incentive to export
to either country. Within this example, it is straightforward to show that all quantities (pre- and
post-acquisition) are strictly positive for t < tmax  0:35d and that the gain to owner 1 from
monopolization is given by:
G = mon   2   3     1
where 1 is owner 1s prot if it does not acquire any rms, and 2 (3) is the opportunity cost of







(257 105t  23 882d) :




Example 2 illustrates the following.
Result 3: In Example 2, trade liberalization, in the presence of market segmentation, renders
a merger wave more likely given that the pre-liberalization tari¤ level is su¢ciently high, that is,
t 2 [0:093d; tmax]:
Thus trade liberalization in the form of tari¤ cuts may trigger merger waves, provided that
markets remain segmented. In this case, the benets of trade liberalization would be reduced and
could even be overturned, in the absence of intervention by an antitrust authority. The policy
implication of the above is that it may be necessary to ensure that trade liberalization, in the form
of tari¤ reductions, is accompanied by closer economic integration in order to avoid anticompetitive
e¤ects arising from acquisitions. This is a more pressing concern for developing countries or emerg-
ing markets which may lack e¤ective merger policies, given that MNEs are increasingly acquiring
rms in such economies. Moreover, in such cases, "trade liberalization" has the opposite e¤ect as
that of "economic integration" since as per Propositions 1-3, the latter hinders the realization of
cross-border merger waves. This dichotomy between the roles played by "trade liberalization" and




By introducing market segmentation, this paper reverses a key result well established in the existing
merger literature which has mainly focused on the scenario where the industry in question serves
a single integrated market.
The paper shows that under segmented markets, a merger may inict a negative externality
on the non-merging rms. This contradicts the classic intuition derived in Stigler (1950) and the
ensuing IO literature built around this seminal work (such as Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)
and Kamien and Zang (1990). The new insight generated by this reversal of the existing intuition
is that acquisitions undertaken by a multinational rm are more likely to occur in industries where
rms face strictly convex cost functions and serve segmented markets rather than a single integrated
market. In this case, within a two-country model, the paper shows that when a multinational rm
acquires a local rm in one of the markets, the price in that market rises but the price in the other
falls. This decreases the prot that the local rm in the other market would obtain if it remained
outside the merger, making it cheaper to acquire. This mechanism does not function if the industry
serves a single integrated market, revealing a new rationale for reducing frictions between markets
in order to create a single integrated market (as, for example, per the goals of the EU).
Developing countries and emerging markets should be most cautious when dealing with indus-
tries possessing these characteristics (segmented markets and convex costs), since they may lack
the necessary institutions to contain monopolization of these industries by MNEs.
When markets are segmented, this paper shows that, since a merger intensies price discrimina-
tion across the di¤erent markets, there will be some winners and some losers (in terms of consumers
located in di¤erent markets) from the same merger such that the approval of a merger may need
to be accompanied by some form of redistribution of the gains. Moreover, if antitrust authorities
aim to maximize consumer surplus across multiple segmented markets, the paper shows that they
should not restrict their approvals to only those mergers which are Pareto improving. This is
because, as long the markets are su¢ciently asymmetric with regard to their demand conditions,
aggregate consumer surplus across markets increases due to an acquisition.
Moreover, these results gain importance in light of two pieces of well documented empirical
evidence. First, market segmentation across countries appears to be prevelant due to the observed
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price discrimination across di¤erent destinations by exporting rms from di¤erent source countries
including the US, UK, Japan, Germany, France and Italy. Second, cross-border mergers are ob-
served to occur more frequently in service industries (which is a prime example of an industry where
markets are naturally segmented) than in manufacturing and primary industries, in line with the
merger process outlined in this paper.
Appendix:
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Part (i)
If no acquisitions occur, the prot of owner i in period 2, i; is given by the following:












for i 2 [2; :::;mA]






for i 2 [mA+1; :::;m]
Subsequent to the acquisition of M by owner 1, the prot of owner i in period 2, Mi; is given by
the following:












for i 2 K \ f2; :::;mAg






for i 2 K \ fmA + 1; :::;mg
The proof consists of two steps. Step 1 shows that holding total output sold in A constant at
the pre-merger output level, QA; the post-merger quantity sold by owner 1 in B rises due to the
merger. Step 2 shows that given a rise in the quantity sold by owner 1 in B; the total quantity sold
in A must fall below the pre-merger level.
Step 1:
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Suppose that the output produced at each rm owned by owner 1, subsequent to the merger, is






























Now consider the rst order necessary condition of owner 1 with respect to the output sold in B:
In (12) ; q1A; q1B and QB denote that values that satisfy owner 1s rst order necessary condition
if there are no acquisitions by owner 1.
PB (QB) + q1BP
0
B (QB)  C
0 (:) = 0 (12)
By Lemma 1, C 0 (:) falls from (10) to (11) due to the acquisition of the M rms by owner 1:
Therefore, Lemma 1, together with Assumption 2, implies that, subsequent to the acquisitions,
holding constant the output sold in A by all rms at their pre-merger levels, owner 1s post-
acquisition rst order necessary condition is only satised if the output sold by owner 1 in B rises
to a level above q1B:
Step 2:
Suppose that the post-acquisition rst order necessary condition of owner 1 with respect to q1A is
satised at the pre-acquisition output levels, q1A and q1B; such that we have











This contradicts Step 1, since Step 1 shows that if total output sold in A is held constant at the
pre-merger output level, QA; then post-merger output sold by owner 1 in B; q̂1B; must exceed
q1B: Replacing q1B with q̂1B in (13) ; it follows from Assumption 2 that (13) is only satised if the
output sold by owner 1 in A falls to a level below q1A:
Steps 1-2 together show that, starting with the pre-acquisition output levels at each rm, post-
acquisition, owner 1 has an incentive to decrease its sales in A and increase its sales in B: Let qM1A
and qM1B be the post-merger equilibrium quantities sold by owner 1: Steps 1-2 imply that
qM1A < q1A (14)
and
qM1B > q1B (15)
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider an exogenous change in the output of rm i in an N rm
Cournot oligopoly. If the other rms outputs adjust to re-establish a Cournot equilibrium and
Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, their rst lemma shows that the aggregate output moves in the same
direction as rm is output. In this case, due to the acquisition of the M rms by owner 1; there is
an exogenous decrease in the output of owner 1 in A; as shown by (14). Therefore, by Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), total output in A decreases. This implies the following:
P (QA) < P (QMA)
Conversely, due to the acquisition of the M rms by owner 1; there is an exogenous increase in the
output of owner 3 in B; as shown by (15). Therefore, by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), total output
in B increases. This implies the following:
P (QB) > P (QMB)
Proof of Part (ii):
This proof is identical to that of Proposition 3 in Kamien and Zang (1991). 
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the possibility of an equilibrium where owner 1 acquires all rms owned by a single owner,
say owner a, in A; and all rms owned by a single owner, say owner b, in B: Let 1 be the Stage 2
prots of owner 1 if he is successful in acquiring these rms. Let ~1 be the Stage 2 prots of owner
1 if he does not acquire any rms. Let a (b) be the Stage 2 prots of owner a (b) if this owner
unilaterally rejects owner 1s bid whilst the other owner does not. It follows that owner 1 has to
pay at least a (b) in order to induce owner a (owner b) to accept the o¤er. We have that
ijS < ijI ; i = a; b (16)
The inequality in (16) follows from Lemma 2 and Assumptions 3 and 3. The discussion is
identical to that of the proof of Proposition 1. Let owner 1s gain from acquiring the rms of
owners a and b be denoted by:
G = 1   a   b     ~1
We note that since nA = nB and PA (:) = PB (:) ; we have that
1jS = 1jI (17)
and
~1jS = ~1jI (18)
We have G  0 if and only if
    1   a   b   ~1 (19)
It follows from (16) ; (17) and (18) that
jS > jI (20)
Proposition 2 follows directly from (9) : 
27
References
Andrade, Gregor, Mark Mitchell and Erik Sta¤ord, "New evidence and perspectives on mergers,"
2001, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 103-20.
Anand, Jaideep, and Andrew Delios, "Absolute and relative resources as determinants of interna-
tional acquisitions," 2002, Strategic Management Journal, 23, 119-34.
Atkeson, Andrew and Ariel T. Burstein, "Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Rela-
tive Prices," 2008, American Economic Review, 98, 1998-2031.
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Anthony J. Venables, Frank G. Barry, Karolina Ekholm, Anna M. Fal-
zoni, Jan I. Haaland, Karen H. Midelfart and Alessandro Turrini, Multinational Firms in the World
Economy, 2004, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott, "Firms in
International Trade," 2007, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 105130.
Bertrand, Olivier and Habib Zitouna, "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Restructuring: The
Role of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions," 2006, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 15, 479515.
Bjorvatn, Kjetil, "Economic integration and the protability of cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions," 2004, European Economic Review, 48(6), 1211-26.
Brakman, Steven, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, "Cross-Border Mergers and Ac-
quisitions: The Facts as a Guide for International Economics," 2006, CESifo Working Paper No.
1823, Munich.
Breinlich, Holger, "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Restructuring Through Mergers and Acqui-
sitions," 2008, Journal of International Economics, 76, 254-66.
Bulow, Jeremy I., John D. Geanakoplos and Paul D. Klemperer, "Multimarket oligopoly: strategic
substitutes and complements," 1985, The Journal of Political Economy, 93, 488-511.
Caves, Richard E., Multinational enterprises and economic analysis, 1996, Cambridge University
Press (Second Edition).
Chari, Anusha, Paige P. Ouimet and Linda L. Tesar, "Acquiring Control in Emerging Markets:
Evidence from the Stock Market," 2004, NBER Working Papers 10872.
Chudnovsky, Daniel, Industrial Restructuring Through Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of
28
Argentina in the 1990s, 2000, Transnational Corporations, 9, 3358.
Crucini, Mario J., Chris I. Telmer and Marios Zachariadis, "Understanding European Real Ex-
change Rates," 2005, American Economic Review, 95, 724-38.
Das, Satya P. and Sarbajit Sengupta, "Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International
Mergers," 2001, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10, 565-90.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial A¤airs, "Economic Eval-
uation of the Internal Market" 1996.
European Commission, Competition DG, "Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report," 2009.
Fabiani, Silvia, Martine Druant, Ignacio Hernando, Claudia Kwapil, Bettina Landau, Claire Lou-
pias, Fernando Martins, Thomas Y. Mathä, Roberto Sabbatini, Harald Stahl and Ad C. J. Stokman,
"The pricing behaviour of rms in the euro area - new survey evidence," 2005, Working Paper Series
535, European Central Bank.
Falvey, Rod, "Mergers in Open Economies", 1998, The World Economy, 21, 10611076.
Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," 1990, The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 80, 107-126.
Francois, Joseph and Henrik Horn, "Competition Policy in an Open Economy," 1998, Discussion
Paper No. 98-092/2, Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Fumagalli, Eileen and Helder Vasconcelos, "Cross-Border Merger Waves," 2006, CEPR Discussion
Papers 5601.
Gaudet, Gerard and Stephen Salant, "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition: Further
Results," 1992, Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences Economiques, UQAM 9203,
Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
Gaughan, Patrick A., Mergers, acquisitions and corporate restructurings, 2002, New York: John
Wiley and Sons (Third Edition).
Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Frank Verboven, "The Evolution of Price Dispersion in the European
Car Market," 2001, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 811-48.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Frank Verboven, "Market integration and convergence to the Law of
One PriceL evidence from the European car market," 2005, Journal of International Economics,
65, 49-73.
Gugler, Klaus, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin Yurtolgu and Christine Zulehner, "The e¤ects of
29
mergers: an international comparison," 2003, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21,
625-53.
Head, Keith and John Ries, "International mergers and welfare under decentralized competition
policy," 1997, Canadian Journal of Economics, 30, 1104-23.
Helpman, Elhanan, A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corporations,
1984, Journal of Political Economy, 92, 451471.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple, "Exports Versus FDI with Heteroge-
neous Firms," 2004, American Economic Review, 94 (1), 300316.
Hemmingsson, Elisabeth "The Volvo-Scania merger: An Analysis of the EC Merger Process," 2002,
mimeo, Faculty of Law, Gothenburg School of Economics and Commercial Law.
Horn, Henrik and James Levinsohn, "Merger policies and trade liberalization," 2001, The Economic
Journal, 111, 244-76.
Horn, Henrik and Lars Persson, "The Equilibrium Ownership of an International Oligopoly," 2001,
Journal of International Economics, 53, 307333.
Ivaldi, Mark and Frank Verboven, "Quantifying the e¤ects from horizontal mergers in European
competition policy," 2005, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, 669-91.
Kamien, Morton I. & Israel Zang, "The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition," 1990, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 465-99.
Kamien, Morton I. & Israel Zang, "Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization,"
1991, Games and Economic Behaviour, 3, 323-38.
Kamien, Morton I. & Israel Zang, "Monopolization by sequential acquisition," 1993, Journal of
Law and Economic Organization, 9, 205-29.
Klimenko, M. and Kamal Saggi, "Technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with
network externalities," 2007, Canadian Journal of Economics, 40, 176-206.
Knetter, Michael M., "Price Discrimination by U.S. and German Exporters," 1989, American
Economic Review, 79, 198-210.
Knetter, Michael M., "International Comparisons of Price-to-Market Behavior," 1993, American
Economic Review, 83, 473-86.
Long, Ngo V. and Neil Vousden, The E¤ects of Trade Liberalization on Cost-Reducing Horizontal
Mergers," 1995, Review of International Economics, 3, 141155.
30
Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, "National Versus International
Mergers in Unionized Oligopoly," 2006, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(1), 212-33.
Markusen, James, Multinational rms and the theory of international trade, 2002, Cambridge, MA,
MIT Press.
Mattoo, Aaditya, Marcelo Olarreaga and Kamal Saggi, "Mode of foreign entry, technology transfer,
and FDI policy," 2004, Journal of Development Economics, 75, 95-111.
Melitz, Marc J., "The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry pro-
ductivity," 2003, Econometrica, 71, 1695-1725.
Neary, Peter, "Cross-border mergers as instruments of comparative advantage," 2007, Review of
Economic Studies, 74, 1229-57.
Nguyen, Daniel and Georg Schaur, "Cost Linkages Transmit Volatility Across Markets," 2010,
EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of
Copenhagen.
Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple, "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greeneld foreign
direct investment: The role of rm heterogeneity," 2007, Journal of International Economics, 72,
336-65.
Nocke, Volker and Stephen Yeaple, "An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment," 2008,
Review of Economic Studies, 75, 529-57.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Lars Persson, "Investment liberalization -why a restrictive cross-border
merger policy can be counterproductive?" 2007, Journal of International Economics, 72, 366-80.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Lars Persson, "Globalization and protability of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions," 2008a, Economic Theory, 35(2), 241-66.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Lars Persson, "Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions Policy in Service
Markets," 2008b, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 8(3), 269-93.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, Lars Persson and Jonas Vlachos, "Cross-border acquisitions and taxes: e¢-
ciency and tax revenues," 2009, Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(4), 1473-1500.
Perry, M. and R. Porter, "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," 1985, American
Economic Review, 75, 219227.
Qiu, Larry D. and Wen Zhou, "International mergers: Incentives and welfare," 2006, Journal of
International Economics, 68, 38-58.
31
Roberts, Mark J. and James R. Tybout, "What makes exports boom?" 1997, Directions in Devel-
opment Series, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Saggi, Kamal and Halis M. Yildiz, "On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger
Policies," 2006, Review of International Economics, 14, 212-25.
Salant, Stephen W., Sheldon Switzer and Robert J. Reynolds, "Losses from horizontal merger:
The e¤ects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium," 1983, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (2), 185-99.
Straume, Odd Rune, "International mergers and trade liberalization: implications for unionized
labour," 2003, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(5), 717-35.
Toxvaerd, Flavio, "Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs," 2008, Journal of Economic
Theory, 140, 1-26.
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, 2004, 2010, United Nations, New York.
Whinston, Michael D., Lectures on Antitrust Economics, 2006, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
32
